Studying Law as the Possibility of Principled Action by Christenson, Gordon A.
University of Cincinnati College of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1973
Studying Law as the Possibility of Principled Action
Gordon A. Christenson
University of Cincinnati College of Law, gordon.christenson@uc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal History, Theory
and Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Cincinnati
College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christenson, Gordon A., "Studying Law as the Possibility of Principled Action" (1973). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper
172.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/172
STUDYING LAW AS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRINCIPLED
ACTION
By GORDON A. CHRISTENSON*
The study of law may be viewed as the critical analysis of a
system of logically coherent rules governing action. In the United
States, the responsibility for legal education has traditionally
fallen upon the law schools. Within the legal profession and law
schools a restive spirit now prevails, seeking to further clarify the
meaning of that responsibility.' Two responses appear in the law
schools, for good or ill.
First, there is the search for worldly skills. Evidence of this
direction is found in the development of clinical methods and in
concrete attempts to use professionals and the practical world for
education outside the classroom.2 It seeks to use the practical or
professional world for preparation. Second, almost simultane-
ously there appears to be a turning inward, away from the world
of action. This withdrawal may be described as the search for
intellectual strength in the world of value and introspection.'
I shall attempt to show that proper perspectives in both
directions are essential to preparation in law. Moving from an
appraisal of the clinical mode, I shall consider the problem of
ethical consciousness associated with action, noting why it is
important to ask whether principled action is possible. Such pos-
*Dean and Professor of Law, The American University Law School, Washington,
D.C.; B.S., J.D., University of Utah; S.J.D., The George Washington University.
'See, e.g., TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: 1971, 1971 AALS
PROCEEDINGS, Part One, Section II (P. Carrington ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as the
Carrington Reportl; H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 48,
161 (1972) thereinafter cited as PACKER & EHRLICH]. Thinking in these reports about the
goals of legal education is pragmatic. Some goals are quality and availability of legal
services, access to power, social mobility, freedom and humaneness for students, better
understanding between lawyers and other professionals, intellectual inquiry, vigorous ra-
tionality, and use of secular values.
2ABA APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE §§ 302, 306
(1973). This expression of the so-called "apprenticeship method" has appeared in many
forms during the brief history of legal education in the United States. Its struggle with
"academic" law training and the Jeffersonian model introduced in 1779 at William and
Mary is traced in II A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 173-223
(1965).
'Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Lasswell & McDougal].
While the contemporary focus has shifted since Lasswell and McDougal introduced a
comprehensive value-oriented jurisprudence based on human dignity, the concern for
thinking reflectively about choices based on explicit criteria appears the same.
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sibility, I conclude, requires the successful integration of proper
worldly skills with the best of intellectual powers.
I. PREPARING THE NEW GENERATION
Every society which wishes to survive must continuously pre-
pare the new generation. In the term "new generation" I include
all those who will most likely affect our future, not only the
young. Preparation is an act of faith. It expresses a belief that we
can equip our children and those yet unborn with the ability both
to lead full lives and to cope with problems expected and unex-
pected. Preparation is the function of all education. The special
function of education in law is preparing new lawyers with skills
and intellectual traits essential for acting within limits. The no-
tion of reasoned limits to public and private action is in my view
essential to survival. It is the duty of legal education to make such
a notion possible. The long term self-interest of all requires this
possibility, which I call the possibility of principled action.
I use the term "possibility" further to clarify responsibilities
of academic lawyers. It is important that we consider the widest
range of possibilities of action for the common good according to
principles of law. This assumes law's creativity in shaping alter-
natives and rejects the idea that there is any single ideology which
ought to govern all conduct. Just as there are many possibilities
so also are there many principles. Some of these are settled; oth-
ers may change; still others are logically inconsistent. The process
of change must be open ended and yet imply limits to action.' We
need not be concerned here about the mechanics of that process,
but we are in debt to legal reasoning for the perfection of common
principles through experience, in light of dissent and conflicting
authority.
Survival without law as we know it is a competing possibility
in preparing the new generation. Some think that behavioralism,5
secularism,' and the seldom articulated jurisprudence called neo-
realism (held by many contemporary American lawyers) have
already collapsed faith in the possibility that law schools can
'Cf. Stone-de Montpensier, The Compleat Wrangler, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1001 (1966).
Stone-de Montpensier argues that "the law is a calculus having a logic of its own." Id. at
1002.
'PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 33.
'Id. at 34. Packer and Ehrlich state, "We believe seculiarization to be the prime
intellectual cause of the contemporary malaise in legal education." Id. They draw their
views on secularism largely from Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical
Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968).
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PRINCIPLED ACTION
prepare the new generation in a tradition of reasoned limits.7
While the necessary condition of survival requires order, it does
not require a legal system based on the social contract notions of
liberty and equality with their judicially imposed limits on public
and private power. Such traditional limits very simply could be
eliminated. The profession of law could be shorn of its indepen-
dent claim to hold "justice itself in trust."' Legal education under
this alternative could mean, as some believe has happened al-
ready, training the new generation of lawyers to be technical serv-
ants of public and private power, not officers of the court commit-
ted to the common good. Rules might be applied, but in different
ways under control of different institutions, without the necessity
of an independent process.
Socialization of all legal services is also a distinct alterna-
tive,' retaining the possibility of principled action only to the
extent that the state itself would allow. We could easily forego an
independent legal system in favor of a bureaucratic one. More
likely, some legal services probably will continue to move toward
socialization, such as no-fault insurance, welfare administration,
trust administration, and tax services, while others remain inde-
pendent. Some legal services programs, when administered by
government, may lose independence or risk suffering loss of funds
for offensive independent action.
Classical radicalism is yet another response. Traditionally, it
7Foreword to CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL. OF THE FUTURE (E. Kitch ed.,
Univ. of Chicago Conf. Series No. 20, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Kitchi.
'CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMUND CAHN READER 251-52 (L. Cahn ed. 1962).
It was our profession .. .that conceived and developed the moral pattern
of the trustee, the man who acts devotedly on behalf of another and who is
so exempt from the esurient ways of his society that he avoids even the
possibility of conflict between his trust duties and his selfish interests ...
Moreover, since the lawyer must conduct himself worthily as an officer of the
court, he has another and more imposing fiduciary obligation: the profession
holds justice itself in trust. Rightly then the humblest lawyer may preen
himself whenever a court does honor to its function; and by the same token,
all instances of corruption are at his cost and to his shame. What a radical
standard to erect in this our acquisitive and Philistine society!
Id.
'Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 31 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
37, 45-46 (1947). Smith recognizes the possibility of socialization, but is opposed to it. See
ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES-1972 (M. Paulsen
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen]; Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering Process
Through a New Delivery System: The Emergence and State of Legal Paraprofessionalism,
71 CoIAuM. L. REV. 1153 (1971). Dean Paulsen and Professor Brickman share the concern
first articulated by Reginald Smith in 1947 for adequate delivery of legal services by
private sources rather than by the government.
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has sought to smash the legal order or dissolve it through physical
migration or spiritual withdrawal. Ironically, in explaining a dif-
ferent radicalism inherent in the profession of law, Edmund Cahn
wrote:
Not one of these radicalisms admits of the possibility that men may
be transformed without either destroying or leaving their society.
This possibility-the possibility that a man may continue to partici-
pate in his social order and nevertheless become transformed-all
of them exclude. And it is this possibility on which we lawyers stake
our professional lives!' 0
We know from what lawyers in fact do that they legislate,
govern, and judge, in addition to serving clients. They provide
public service as well as private. They represent both public and
private interests. They are participants in the international legal
system. While the forms of legal services may change, we begin
with the conservative assumption that we are not willing to sur-
vive without law. Accordingly, society must prepare the legal
profession to preserve the possibility of action and change accord-
ing to principle.
II. THE CLINICAL APPROACH TO PREPARATION
Recent experience with legal education's concern for the
practical world has not yet demonstrated why programs now
called clinical are an essential part of law study. It is not enough
that clinical legal education is helpful or transitional to practice
or even useful pedagogically. Why are clinical legal education
methods or programs essential?" What is it in them which credi-
bly can support the claims of both students and law teachers that
clinical education is a necessary complement to the traditional
method?2
As Bellow points out, the term "clinical" is ambiguous and
impedes inquiry. 3 In the technical sense it means learning by
"'CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMUND CAHN READER, supra note 8, at 253-54.
"COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SECOND BIENNIAL
REPORT, 1971-1972 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CLEPR]. In the President's Report, Wil-
liam Pincus states:
CLEPR ... has always had human development through education as its
primary concern. We have also insisted that the service setting is essential
for this kind of education. This is because human development ... requires
the assumption of professional responsibility.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
"?For a presentation of some of the factors leading to these claims, see Pincus, Legal
Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 27, 28, 31-
33 (1973) ICLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT is hereinafter cited as CELS].
"Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Edu-
cation as Methodology, in CELS, supra note 12, at 374, 375.
VOL. 50
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PRINCIPLED ACTION
students under professional supervision, handling real problems
in relationship with a real client for academic credit. As a strategy
for maximizing intrusion into a particular curriculum, 4 control
over the conditions of experimentation and development, 5 or the
impact of modest grant funds, 6 this limited definition is highly
effective. However, use of the service setting demands a more
satisfactory reason for being essential; it demands integration
with the best of the analytic methods.
A. Legal Services of Higher Quality and Lower Cost?
One justification for clinical programs is that law schools are
partly responsible for providing a better quality of legal services
at moderate cost.' Let us call this the socioeconomic responsibil-
ity of law schools, since it merges the quality of legal education
with socioeconomic goals. This justification is questionable on
two bases. The first lies in its economic assumptions. The second
results from its failure to distinguish utilitarian judgments about
social needs for lawyers from the method applied for their
supply."
First, it is assumed that, if law schools developed and used
clinical programs properly, the supply of quality delivery sys-
tems, integrating paraprofessionals and professionals, would au-
tomatically create markets for the services provided. Presumably,
competition would ensure wider market penetration, better serv-
ice, and lower cost. 9 It is postulated that students would accept
such a liberal view in their payment of tuition and course
enrollment.
It is also argued that efficient private law firms could create
a market for teams of clinically trained lawyers and paraprofes-
sionals. However, if the price of service is to go down, the law
firms will themselves have to become machinelike bureaucracies
in order to achieve economies of scale, and efficiency by itself
"Brickman, CLEPR and Clinical Educaton: A Review and Analysis, in CELS, supra
note 12, at 56, 61.
'"See Pincus, supra note 12, at 30-31.
"See Brickman, supra note 14, at 60.
'7Id. at 65-66.
'"Cf. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 3 (1955). Rawls distin-
guishes the utilitarian need for a rule from the method used to apply it.
"See Kitch, supra note 7, at 39; Brickman, supra note 9. But see Paulsen, supra note
9, at 57-61. Posner clarifies the cost analysis based on competition to suggest that litiga-
tion for the poor and middle class might be a good strategy if lawyers were plentiful enough
to drive the price of legal services very low. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 346-47
(1972).
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surely will neither benefit the average citizen nor serve the inter-
ests of the poor. An increase in quality without a public market
is not likely to reduce price or to spread the benefits of
competition."
Economic priorities, either at present or in the foreseeable
future, are not likely to create much residual market for legal
services offered through law school clinical programs. Nor is
placement of graduates in legal services programs dependent on
any law school clinical program, except, perhaps, as a means of
producing lawyers who will be satisfied with less income. An un-
likely alternative might be for the public to fund law school clin-
ics as separate institutions. Teaching hospitals have survived by
claiming a large portion of health care funds. Law school clinics,
however, are not likely to sustain the same support.
Second, law schools should not confuse the legal service need
or market with their proper concern for what law schools do, nor
should they be too eager to imitate the health care strategy. Al-
though some arguments for clinical programs are still drawn from
the battered analogy to the health delivery system," the forms
and quality of that system are highly questionable and should not
be used as valid analogies. 2 The health delivery system is sup-
ported by clinical medical training centered in urban or suburban
hospitals. Quality health care is provided through equipment and
services which are elaborate, sophisticated, and thoroughly inte-
grated. It is quality at a price. This centralization- may have
diverted health care from the poor and the communities by mak-
ing its cost prohibitive and by making medical resources depen-
dent on teams of specialists and technicians in hospitals away
from community needs. Even when care in selecting medical stu-
dents seeks to maximize the distribution of community services,
"See generally Paulsen, supra note 9, at 16-49. Dean Paulsen explores the conse-
quences of group legal services, prepaid insurance, and specialization, and the results of
experiments with some of these forms of legal service in Louisiana and other states. The
leading study on prepaid legal services, he states, concludes that "'in general, legal
insurance cannot achieve the economies of scale possible through group legal services.' "
Id. at 37. He also indicates that specialization as a result of group legal services may
"prove to be a cost, rather than a cost saver, for the general public" as well as result in
presenting dangers of "lawyers becoming too narrow." Id. at 46. See also Kitch, supra note
7, at 39.
2 Creger & Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal Education,
in Kitch, supra note 7, at 77. Stoltz, Packer, and Ehrlich all indicate it is a bad analogy.
PACKER & EHRICH, supra note 1, at 39; Stoltz, Clinical Experience in American Legal
Education: Why Has It Failed?, in Kitch, supra note 7, at 54, 70.
11R. COOK, THE YEAR OF THE INTERN (1972).
VOL. 50
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medical technicians and doctors tend to work in hospitals, not in
the communities. Some states have stopped building hospitals on
the grounds that they reflect the wrong priorities for health care,
are serving the wrong people, and are too costly. 3
In other words, the questions of public priorities have not
been thoroughly considered in the simplistic application of the
analogy. Wider sharing of health or legal care does not necessarily
result from clinical training. It may well lead to the opposite
result. The reaction of the treated against the treatment received
at teaching hospitals, where patients are mere teaching objects,
is only beginning to surface. Additionally, some medical interns
are seriously questioning the quality of an education that follows
medical technique and lacks humanity.24
Let me rephrase my skepticism in another way. It may be
that the most efficient way of disseminating good legal care would
be to simplify our legal system. To do that, very high quality,
sophisticated lawyers, obviously concerned with human needs,
will be required. If our premise is that the existing legal system
is becoming more complex, and if we train lawyers and parapro-
fessionals to help cope with the existing complexities more effi-
ciently and humanely, then such a choice could well solidify and
reinforce existing ills of the status quo, preventing the change and
simplification of law. A new bureaucracy and constitutency is
thus created, perpetuated by convenience which soon gains
claims to necessity.
However, the permanence of technical rules is not so easily
accepted for the good of society. What happens if a change in
public policy or technology should require changes in the rules?
Assuming that a change occurs over the objections of those it will
displace, who would be responsible for their obsolesence? 5 Who
would employ them or pay to retrain them? The vested interest
of forces of these kinds is hard to measure, but I would assume
that it creates a very great inertial draw upon our ability to
" Herbert Denenberg, Commissioner of Insurance of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, has stated that present priorities of urban hospitals-all of which seem to be trying
to provide a functionally comprehensive facility regardless of need-cost the public mil-
lions in duplicative and underused services. Interview between Dick Cavett and Herbert
Denenberg, Dec. 18, 1973, broadcast by the American Broadcasting Corporation.
4R. CooK, supra note 22.
"5 R. M. Hutchins views theoretical legal education as the most practical for preparing
lawyers for leadership in a changing world and for avoiding obsolescence. Hutchins, The
University Law School, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF ToMORRow 5, 7 (D. Haber & J. Cohen eds.
1968).
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change or simplify the legal system or to spread its benefits. As
professional as the tax bar and the Internal Revenue Service are,
how resistant is the tax code to simplification? How resistant is
the general bar to the elimination of "liability" or the patent bar
to a tougher standard of patentability?
In the total process of legal education as I have defined it,
the socioeconomic considerations are important for the Congress,
the bar, the services industries, and all citizens. Law schools
should also be concerned with responding in quality, but they are
neither social service agencies" nor formulators of the future
directions of manpower supply and demand. Their essential func-
tion is limited to preparing future professionals to practice in and
cope with a changing world. All other functions are important,
but they are incidental and flow from different assumptions. In
addition, the secondary functions depend largely upon the kinds
of skills learned in the study of law in its primary formulation.
B. A New Synthesis of Theory and Practice?
Clinical legal education requires a sounder relationship with
the world of affairs before it can be accepted as an integral and
valuable part of law school curricula. Langdell and his heirs, as
everyone likes to point out, introduced the case method to provide
a synthesis between the actual world of judicial decisionmaking
and the scholarly world of intellectual or scientific inquiry into
legal principles.27 The method replaced presentation of legal prin-
ciples through the use of lectures such as Blackstone's
Commentaries. It was a revolution in legal education, and it still
has a profound effect and role. The radical empiricism of case
study is compelling." Since that time, numerous modifications of
the case method approach have been proposed, all designed to
reach a better synthesis. Notable are the contributions of the
realists and the Columbia law faculty of the twenties and thirties.
Lasswell and McDougal in the area of policy-science also at-
tempted to link the disciplines of the social sciences with law in
a comprehensive methodology.
29
Advocates of clinical legal education also claim a new syn-
thesis of the world of action with intellectual inquiry, within a
service context. 0 Some see it as stimulating the only new thought
2"Kitch, supra note 7, at 48.
2See generally Stoltz, supra note 21.
2Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928).
21Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 3.
"It may be that the experience with clinical legal education will lead us back to the
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on legal education in the 100 years since Langdell.' Current argu-
ments in support of this claim seem to be grounded in the social
science of the neorealists. Neorealism, as interpreted by Kitch,
views "law not as a cultural, but as a behavioral phenomenon,
best understood through the techniques of the social sciences.
'32
Judicial opinions are viewed as rationalizations for decisions
grounded in service of clients and little related to the reasons set
forth. The practice of law is seen as the art of maximizing the
client's interests using a panoply of clinical skills called service.
With its material and practical origin, neorealism lends itself
to clinical legal education. Law students can plunge into the
heart of legal practice by representing a client with a "just cause"
(indigent, popular, or powerful clients all have just causes). Di-
vorced from a client's cause, clinical education simply teaches a
technique of service which, if coupled with critical thought and
substance, may indeed be a most valuable aid in offsetting a
tendency for ethical arrogance.
3
1
However, with whatever interpretation, the new movements
in clinical methods are not yet sufficient for an adequate connec-
tion of substantive reasoning with the world of action. Whether
classroom. Professor Bellow seems to say that pressures placed upon the student for
resolution of client problems in the clinical experience tend to push intellectual inquiry
aside in favor of practical solutions requiring psychological insights. Bellow, supra note
13, at 390-91. The clinical attempt to turn the study of law away from a self-contained
discipline also may have the opposite effect. Professor Stoltz states:
Clinical experience seems to value practical experience over intellectual ab-
straction and its incorporation into the curriculum would push students
away from interdisciplinary efforts back into the profession, thus tending to
make the law more of a self-contained discipline.
Stoltz, supra note 21, at 68.
3"CLEPR, supra note 11, at 7-8.
"Kitch, supra note 7, at 9.
"Id. at 11. Kitch comments that "Neo-Realism is receptive to the idea of clinical
education." Id.
mThe concentration of Bellow's clinical methodology on human relations skills follows
the ideas of Erikson, Watson, and Stone to their logical conclusion. See text accompanying
notes 36-43 infra. But in so doing, the clinical methodology risks becoming detached from
substance. Clinical methodology is capable of using the power of psychological manipula-
tion with law as an instrument in the service of any client in the world of affairs. Thus,
the synthesis achieved through action may confirm the cynicism of the neorealists. Claims
for the clinical method as outlined by Bellow do not seem to agree with teaching the
personal integration of fact, idea, and value through action as described by Jerome Hall
in his integrative jurisprudence. The achievement of such an integration requires teaching
methods which give one the possibility of forming a world-view and therefore the possibil-
ity of participating in conscious (ethical) action in the world of affairs. This integration
requires a methodology comprised of many perspectives. Bellow, supra note 13; J. HALL,
FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1973).
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in law school or in practice, techniques in service of selected cases
are always tied to service commitments. Emotional or ideological
involvement with causes of community action, defense of indi-
gents, distribution of legal services, assaults on poverty, or envi-
ronmental or consumer crusades may impede, not aid education.
If the main function is to learn skills of service, then clinics sup-
porting causes of the wealthy are as valid as those for the
poor-and they may be better if they involve more complex is-
sues. If social justice is the main object of the clinical method,
then its justification is not education but service itself.
Clinical programs select clients to whom students are as-
signed representation for educational value under supervision.
The process for such selection necessarily reflects ethical deci-
sions inherent in professional judgments and independence. The
ability to appraise such causes independently requires an intel-
lectual foundation in the values of the profession and the legal
system in which it operates. Skepticism still warns us that skill
in service of any absolute ideology is suspect. Technique without
a conscious ethical base for choice can trick us into thinking that
the righteousness of client or cause is justification enough. And
we are left, as scientists are with the bomb, with a process exter-
nal to our own premises.
C. A Means to Provide Psychological Insights?
Then by what criteria should a sound linkage to the world of
affairs be measured in law school? If they be human or psycholog-
ical insights into interviewing, negotiating, and adversary skills,
how can the clinical method achieve those ends more efficiently
than vicarious methods or problem methods concerning ends and
means? If they be personal insights into the risks of action on
behalf of particular clients, how can risk be countenanced (if we
are to learn from mistakes) in the commitment to the client's best
interests? Will supervision open or narrow insight? Knowledge of
what the law is still determines the main ethical base of the
lawyer. Even if the law itself is instrumental in manipulation, as
we have been led to believe by the neorealists and behavioralists,
substantive analysis and choice are required. How does a claim
of civil disobedience, for example, differ from a claim of ideologi-
cal superiority to the law?3" How can the clinical method provide
a practical way to handle such questions?
31See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE §§ 69-74 (1971). Eh-
renzweig attempts to infuse substantive questions such as these with worldly insights from
psychology. Ir his preface, he states:
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In his psychological studies, Erikson points out that human
biological maturation now occurs 3 to 4 years earlier than a cen-
tury ago, while the modern educational system delays role com-
mitments until much later. In addition, during the expanded
time, the resolution of personal identity is accompanied by a
transformation and crystallization of ideology. Watson's and
Stone's works add to the understanding we are acquiring of this
period in which a novice becomes a professional. According to
Stone, legal education's generalist tradition attracts those who
are undecided about their career choices.36 Modern students tend
to seek a personal commitment which will lend significance and
integrity to persorial identity and will be compatible with their
professional identity. Thus, Stone and Watson both conclude
that, to the extent that an occupational choice is made in law
school, legal education is involved in the student's struggle to
resolve identity. 37 Legal education becomes both a psychological
and intellectual transition into the professional world.
Traditionally, this ritual of entry takes place in the class-
room through the Socratic method. Psychological analysis of legal
education exposes the aggression underlying the Socratic method.
It also offers evidence that the ritual combat can be displaced to
the world of action. This ritual at its best channels hostility into
academic inquiry. 38 At its worst, it can be self-destructive or dissi-
pate into games.
Clinical education programs can serve as vehicles to carry
this ritual combat into the world of indictment, trial, verdict, and
sentence. These programs, however, are moving toward behav-
ioral technique and away from combat ritual. As a consequence,
we are seeing the main thrust of the clinical method heading
toward human relations role playing-into the protective custody
of the psychologists and away from the world of action. Some
professors have translated what might be called preventive psy-
It is to [today's young] that I shall try to prove that if their trust in a better
world is to bear fruit, they must shun the mere replay of the age-old debate
and trade the shop-worn tools of the "Schools" for those of a modern psychol-
ogy which, with the help of semantic self-control, will separate conscious
reason from much of the subconscious irratio of the past. It will be for others
to forge the new tools. What I have hoped to do is to offer a key to the
toolshed.
Id. at 11.
"Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 H~Av. L. REv. 392, 398-400 (1971).
7Id. at 440; Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism: A Continuing Psychiatric
Analysis, in CELS, supra note 24, at 141-42.
"Stone, supra note 36, at 406-18.
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chotherapy into professional human relations education, teaching
interviewing, counseling, mediating, and negotiating. Bellow has
recently made such a logical extension from clinical education to
methodology. Sacks pioneered the effort. 9 Bellow sees the critical
areas of the clinical method as:
1) the student's assumption and performance of a recognized role
within the legal system; 2) the teacher's reliance on this experience
as the focal point for intellectual inquiry and speculation; and 3) a
number of identifiable tensions which arise out of ordering the
teaching-learning process this way. 0
Clinical legal education seems to yield easily to psychology,
and this may indeed be its strongest contribution to date. How-
ever, the psychological dimensions of legal education must be
distinguished from the use of psychology as a technique in clinics.
Bellow's suggestion of the centrality of role playing in the clinical
method, representing psychological adjustment in the profes-
sional world, and his analysis of its instructional counterpart, are
admittedly limited. Stone outlines the psychological dangers of
clinical education: that extraordinarily complex and bad emo-
tional entanglements can result; that no intellectual guidelines
exist for avoiding emotional involvement; and that the romantic
call to put aside professional limits and "plunge into the human
relationship" is irresistible." We are beginning to see how costly
in time and professional development are the psychological in-
volvements of the clinics even with the best of academic supervi-
sion. While law school clinics handle real cases, students as yet
have neither incentives to assume nor defenses against the risks
of the practical world and the disastrous consequences that can
occur. We do not know whether the clinical method is the best
way to establish a professional relationship from a psychological
point of view.2 We have faith that refinements of clinical experi-
ence will lead to the self-critical learning of interviewing, coun-
selling, and negotiating skills-human relations skills-prior to
emotional involvement with clients and their problems.43 If this
"Sacks, Human-Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J. LEGAL ED.
316 (1959).
'"Bellow, supra note 13, at 379.
"Stone, supra note 36, at 392, 433-34.
"The danger lies in the lack of faculty commitment to clinical education as a legiti-
mate and valuable activity, for, as Stone warns, without such a commitment "students
will perceive clinical work as no more than a therapeutic outlet." Id. at 427.
"See, e.g., Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism: A Continuing Psychiatric
Analysis, in CELS, supra note 12, at 139; Watson, Professionalizing the Lawyer's Role as
Counselor: Risk-Taking for Rewards, 1969 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 17; Watson, The Quest
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end is to be achieved, however, a secure world-view is necessary,
especially for lawyers.
III. WORLD-VIEW
In 1923, Albert Schweitzer considered the relationship be-
tween ethical consciousness and what he termed a "world-
view."44 Schweitzer pointed out that stoic and Eastern spiritual
influence initially placed ethical efforts above material progress
in our tradition. 5 Then, "man's ethical energy died away, while
the conquests achieved by his spirit in the material sphere in-
creased by leaps and bounds."" Scientific, technical, and artistic
achievements were mistaken for civilization, with no ethical
base. 7 Thinking we were on "firm ground at last," we sank help-
less in the stream of events. Schweitzer concluded that the glorifi-
cation of practical common sense causes man to turn from ethical
consciousness to the hubristic exultation of boys tobagganing
down a hill, not thinking what the next hill or turn might bring.
A practical person may be under the influence of opinions and
emotions created by the facts of the moment.48
for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv.
91 (1968).
"A. SCHWEITZER, THE DECAY AND THE RESTORATION OF CIVILIZATION (1923).
"Id. at 39-40. Stoicism in ancient Greek philosophy exercised spiritual influence, as
did Chinese, Indian, and Jewish civilizations in placing ethical efforts above those of the
material. The Renaissance combined action and ethics for a time.
$Old.
In this way our own age, having never taken the trouble to reflect, arrived
at the opinion that civilization consists primarily in scientific, technical and
artistic achievements, and that it can reach its goal without ethics, or, at any
rate, with a minimum of them.
Id. Stated another way, the fact that an achievement is possible implies a neutral ethical
posture which tends to permit "progress" even if it does not espouse it. This statement is
similar to neorealism in contemporary law. See Kitch, supra note 7, at 9.
"See Letter from Holmes to Laski, June 1, 1919, in HOLMES-LASKI LErEas 210 (M.
Howe ed. 1953). Holmes writes:
When the Europe and Asia man said Europe has given us the steam engine,
Asia every religion that ever commanded the reverence of mankind-I an-
swered I bet on the steam engine. For the steam engine means science and
science is the root from which comes the flower of our thought. When I have
seen clever women who have read all their lives go off into enthusiasm over
some oriental, pseudo-oriental, or spiritualistic fad it has struck me that all
their reading seems to have given them no point of view-no praejudicia-or
preliminary bets as to the probability that the sign turn to the left will lead
to a cul de sac.
Holmes' "point of view" approaches Schweitzer's "world-view." Both affirm science and
the world.
"A. SCHWEITZER, supra note 44, at 42-43. Compare Kayne's case studies of the same
exaltation felt by some clinical law students in anticipation of going to court for the first
time and of the dangers of the clinical program when it fails to prepare students ade-
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Schweitzer attempted to reestablish an ethical basis by
proposing ethical constructs for our convictions and for the ideas
we seek to stamp on reality. A world-view is thus derived from
personal expression of ethical choice reflected in restraint on
power and control of material change.49 Reawakening of the ethi-
cal spirit begins with a feeling of horror at the alternative, for
"progress" without regard for ethical values is not civilization.
It is a tradition of restraint, conscious choice, requiring a
cultural conception of law:
[It is] supremacy of reason over the dispositions of men [so] that
they, and the nations which they form, will not use against one
another the power which the control of these forces gives them, and
thus plunge one another into a struggle for existence which is far
more terrible than that between men in a state of nature.
5
0
It is by now trite to say that the normative conceptions of law
have not kept pace with the prolific creativity of modern science.
5'
The enlightenment, which broke the hold of the church over the
moral concerns of men, forced orphaned ethical energy to fuse
with secular pursuits.52 The resulting tension between scientific
skepticism and moral imperatives rocked the world in the 20th
century in an eruption of totalitarianism in both East and West.53
Tension between reason and religious will, which has a long his-
quately. Kayne, Cases Illustrating Ethical Problems, in CELS, supra note 12, at 114, 119-
25.
"A. SCHWErrZER, supra note 44, at 64.
5"Id. at 37.
"See Lasswell, International Lawyers and Scientists as Agents and Counter-Agents
of World Public Order, 65 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 366, 372 (1971). Lasswell contrasts
the traditional training of lawyers to passive client-servicing with the need for training
them to mold public policy actively, especially in cooperation with scientists. Cf. Letter
from Laski to Holmes, Aug. 7, 1917, in HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS, supra note 61, at 96. Laski
writes:
I am in accord with your remarks on progress. I think we are mistaking
material advance for spiritual enrichment. The number of people who con-
tentedly believe that we grow better as the clock slips by is really appalling.
I suspect the fact is that unless you are willing to cultivate an intellectual
detachment you grow into that lazy optimism as an excuse for the facts. I
can see real progress in scientific achievement but though it's added to the
comfort of the world I doubt whether as yet it has directed the desires of men
and women into socially productive channels .... Until we go beyond the
stomach stage of civilisation I think the less we talk about progress the
better.
Id.
d5See M. POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 57 (1966).
"M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 109 (1951). "Why did the contradiction between
liberty and scepticism never plunge the ancient world into a totalitarian revolution, like
that of the twentieth century?" Id.
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PRINCIPLED ACTION
tory,54 "has kept Western thought alive" and has presented us
with infinite creative possibilities.55 The powerful combination of
the creativity of modern science and the normative traditions of
law similarly gives us the possibility of controlling change and
facing the future without despair."
Michael Polanyi, a scientist and thinker of this century, and
Wilhelm Dilthey, an historical philosopher of the 19th century,
shared Schweitzer's concern for the reconciliation of outward ac-
tion with inner knowledge and value. Polanyi sought integration
of liberty and the scientific ideal through an epistemology of per-
sonal or tacit knowledge.57 His world-view requires the affirmative
integration of subjective knowledge and outward experience
which occurs in purposeful action. The expression of knowledge
and experience in act contains tacitly much more than the act
seems to require; the "tacit dimension" is the basis for expression
of the particular in creative action which is conscious but does not
explain everything.58 Similarly, the art of a lawyer always seeks
a new level for resolving a dispute or handling a concrete problem.
This new level generally restates or distinguishes the principles
at odds, reconciling them in decision, suspending them by settle-
ment, or changing them by legislation.
Wilhelm Dilthey expressed a related view in his philosophy
of historical understanding.59 A world-view requires a whole un-
derstanding of a person's inner and outward experience. For Dil-
they, "the course of a life preserves the relation between the outer
and something inner, which is the meaning of that life ..
5 For a discussion of the rational development of the irrational in jurisprudence, see
A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 35, §§ 121-75.
55M. POLANYI, supra note 53, at 109-10. "Modern thought is a mixture of Christian
beliefs and Greek doubts. Christian beliefs and Greek doubts are logically incompatible
and the conflict between the two has kept Western thought alive and creative beyond
precedent." Id.
51See Lasswell, supra note 51. Lasswell is concerned with this union in terms of its
consequences for world public order. Cf. O.W. HOLMES, Learning and Science, in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 138, 139 (1920). On the tradition of the law, Holmes said, "But
the present has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be remem-
bered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity." Id.
I'M. PoLANYi, supra note 54; M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958).
5Polyani's world-view approaches that of Holmes, who once wrote, "The postulate of
science is that everything can be explained-but with the view of man that I take, this
perfectly well may not be so." Letter from Holmes to Laski, Feb. 22, 1929, in HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 61, at 1134.
"'See H. TurrLE, WILHELM DILTHEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1969).
"PATTERN & MEANING IN HISTORY: THOUGHTS ON HISTORY AND SOCIETY-WILHELM
DILTHEY 91 (H. Rickman ed. 1962).
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The ability to recognize the objective validity of one's own experi-
ence provides the basis for understanding the experience of an-
other in a different time and place. This "historical understand-
ing" implies the possibility of action affecting others, consciously
tempered by restraint and reciprocity. Such insights permit a
healthy connection with the world through legal analysis of cases
or self-critical examination of one's handling of a legal problem.
During the first half of the 20th century, the Spanish philoso-
pher Ortega y Gasset also presented a view of individual authen-
ticity, but a view in the context of the masses and the rise of
totalitarianism. It was characterized by his statement that "I am
I and my circumstance."'" The relevance of this concept for legal
education at this time in the profession's history is troublesome,
for the profession seems to make peace with a world of totalitar-
ian ideologies. Ortega proposed that "there are as many realities
as there are points of view. The point of view creates the pano-
rama.""2 The ability to structure these points of view or perspec-
tives, which Ortega calls "culture," consists of the use of abstract
thought, allowing one to stand outside his circumstance, turn
back, look at it, and reabsorb it in a different fashion, thereby
grasping one's circumstance in the concrete and enabling the
possibility of authentic action. The resulting relationship with
the world allows the possibility of ordering, illuminating, creat-
ing, and controlling circumstances. Through evaluating one's own
circumstance in the profession or study of law and gaining
perspective, a student similarly may acquire the possibility of
conscious and authentic action. Such a world-view could also be
used to introduce a form of populism to the profession, as indeed
the clinics within law schools seem to imply. Within limits and
spaces, as in legal forms of action or procedure, there is conscious
or ethical shape given to particular legal disputes in the circum-
stances of decision by participants who know their identities.
Through understanding of the art of the law, students can
participate in a possibility that they may act on principle in the
world of affairs on behalf of a client or a public or private interest.
As in the structures of science, 3 music, and myth, 4 law is both
"See J. MARIAS, JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET: CIRCUMSTANCE AND VOCATION 361 (1970).
"Id. at 172. The philosopher Spinoza, who also constructed a philosophy viewing the
world as a whole, said, " '[I]t is of the nature of mind to perceive things from a certain
timeless point of view.'" B. RUSSELL, WISDOM OF THE WEST 201 (1959). See Lasswell &
McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362 (1971).
63See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
"See C. LEVI-STRAuSS, THE RAw AND THE COOKED 26-32 (1969).
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cultural and creative, operating on various levels of thought and
emotion. As myth resolves cultural tensions, music also reconciles
intellectual form and emotion. The law closely resembles the cul-
tural expression of these arts, for it also uses the powers of reason
with the emotions of injustice and fairness." It deals with pain,
hurt, killing, and vengeance. We may also make it dance, if our
world-view is as healthy as Holmes'-or Zorba's."1
Legal education may not easily retreat from a world-view or
be completely captured by its compromises. The possibility that
the new generation in the profession can be prepared for princi-
pled action requires such a healthy view of the world. We can now
see that neither traditional legal education nor the introduction
of clinical modes are sufficient in themselves-though they surely
may become so-to overcome the nihilism of neorealism in the
preparation of the new generation."
"5See Christenson, In Pursuit of the Art of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1972).
"Watson made the application of Zorba's world-view to law "that for ideas to be
communicated effectively they must be danced .... " Watson, Professionalizing the
Lawyer's Role as Counselor, supra note 43, at 21.
"
7M. POLANYI, Perils of Inconsistency, in THE LoGIc OF LIBERTY 93 (1951). In his essay
Polanyi explains how freedom of thought destroyed itself in Europe when the conception
of liberty was pursued to its ultimate conclusion-nihilism, a destructive psychological
world-view leading to totalitarianism. He concludes, suggesting images of my interpreta-
tion in part I of this essay:
The downfall of liberty which follows the success of these attacks [by
the nihilistic intelligentsia of Central and Eastern Europe on Wilson's appeal
to law and reason] demonstrates in hard facts . . . that freedom of thought
is rendered pointless and must disappear, where reason and morality are
deprived of their status as a force in their own right. When the judge in court
can no longer appeal to law and justice; when neither a witness, nor the
newspapers, nor even a scientist reporting on his experiments, can speak the
truth as he knows it; when in public life there is no moral principle com-
manding respect; when the revelations of religion and of art are denied any
substance; then there are no grounds left on which any individual may justly
make a stand against the rulers of the day. Such is the simple logic of
totalitarianism. A nihilistic regime will have to undertake the day-to-day
direction of all activities which are otherwise guided by the intellectual and
moral principles that nihilism declares null and void. Principles must be
replaced by the decrees of an all-embracing Party Line.
Id. at 107-08. He adds a thought that nihilism threatened to engulf ancient Greece when
brilliant young men adopted a philosophy of "smash-and-grab" which they got from the
pursuit of unfettered inquiry introduced to them by Socrates and his educational method.
As a reaction to this, Socrates was impeached and executed. Id. at 109.
Socrates had a world-view-he was a citizen of the world and had "virtue" in his
actions which the young nihilists had rejected by turning the Socratic method on itself.
Neorealism in modern law threatens the same for the brilliant young men and women of
the Socratic case method. A more adequate world-view, whether through clinical educa-
tion or some other method, is essential to maintain the function of legal education I have
proposed-preparing the new generation to the possibility of principled action.
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IV. INTELLECTUAL AND WORLDLY PERSPECTIVES
To complete my thesis that the function of legal education
requires the possibility of action based on principle, I shall pro-
pose two sets of perspectives. These are drawn mainly from my
interpretation at this point, but are hardly original. One intro-
duces intellectual perspectives which are possible to learn; the
other suggests worldly perspectives which are possible to experi-
ence. Each set, however, must be seen from the other's point of
view. Together, they are whole. If my thesis is correct, both sets
are necessary to prepare the new generation for the possibility of
pri4.nied action in the law. If I have followed my own perspec-
tives well enough-which is, of course, the most difficult task of
all-each perspective should strike a note of recognition in the
other.
A. Intellectual Perspectives for Inquiry
The cultivation of skills of inquiry requires intellectual com-
petence which becomes one with skills of practice or action. To
this end, there are a limited number of skills which law schools
ought to promote in preparing novice lawyers. The most basic of
these are (1) analysis, (2) criticism, (3) creativity, (4) artistry or
craft, (5) restraint, and (6) systematic comprehension. None of
these is new; each presumes action. No attempt to be all-
inclusive is required nor is any school of jurisprudence preferred
over any other.
Analytic skill is developed through objective and skeptical
reduction of facts and law into the simplest conceptual parts.
Most law schools take pride in this highly important process. To
state the question in context with the clearest and most economic
use of language is a skill essential to conscious decisions. Analysis
of legal relations permits the most aware introspection. Indeed,
analysis turned on itself can lead to paralysis of decision-as in
nihilism-or to triviality of decision. Skillful analysis does not
stand apart from context or from the action required. The chief
perspective of analysis is skepticism-doubting from many points
of view until the end of doubting is called up from other more
worldly depths and the action resulting is only that which is
consciously necessary according to principle.
Critical skill requires the appraisal or the evaluation of a
legal decision or process in relation to criteria which each person
identifies and clarifies explicitly. This intellectual skill is particu-
larly necessary in avoiding the dangers of blind commitment to
action as a participant-for example, as an advocate or decision-
VOL. 50
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PRINCIPLED ACTION
maker. At some point it is essential to appraise an appellate
decision, a piece of legislation, a government action, or a position
in defense of a client according to external criteria. Is the decision
logically necessary? Is it sound? Is the legislation designed to
meet demonstrated need but no more? Is the defense believable
as well as logical? Does the action have intellectual integrity?
Does it hide emotion in verbalism either wittingly or unwittingly?
Is the reasoning internally consistent? Is the process comprehen-
sive? This judgmental skill is among the most difficult to learn
and among the most valuable for principled action. Even if disa-
greement over this or that principle emerges, the capacity for
independent appraisal free from ideology or imposed criteria is
imperative in holding worldly action accountable to explicitly
defined standards. More often than not these standards are law,
and more likely basic or constitutional law. Critical thought also
implies the evaluation of the various alternatives for action.
Creative skill requires more than analysis or criticism. It
suggests synthesis, the construction of alternative modes of han-
dling problems, the ability to foresee and ameliorate future prob-
lems of law and society, and ingenuity in inventing legal struc-
tures to advance the public good. Law schools, being of a skepti-
cal mold, do not easily expose themselves to the risks of creativ-
ity. Lawyers cannot afford to be fancy in their client's interests.
The skill of creativity I refer to, though, is the nurturing of those
inner resources of ingenuity and the use of all relevant knowledge
and discipline in the solution of important legal problems. The
release of open ended, highly disciplined speculation in law
schools is one appropriate approach. The construction of alterna-
tive legal systems, with incentives and disincentives and a long
term view, might be another, for survival-organized society may
need to create alternative systems of property, criminal law,
wealth, family, organization, obligation, and liability. Creativity
in law also requires the focus of action. Many draft statutes or
private arrangements have been brilliant creations but have died
for want of roots in the world where they must survive. Legal
innovation requires a healthy respect for the world as well as a
spirit of venture. It also demands use of all the sciences and other
disciplines in the creative work of construction.
Legal artistry requires the conscious cultivation of worthy
intellectual traits, as well as flair. There are many of these traits.
They are unique to the intellectual tradition of law and find kind
reception in the practical world. Freund captures the most essen-
1974
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tial of these: 8
a. Dialetic thinking about two conflicting principles
and the art of getting inside the conflict.
b. Contextual thinking which requires asking what
one means by a question.
c. Ethical thinking about the meaning of just expecta-
tions through concepts such as the law of contracts and
public policy.
d. Genetic thinking about how the law responds to
change in the modes of production and distribution,
labor, "progress," and negligence, and to the changing
patterns of life.
e. Associative thinking by metaphor and adaptive or
assimilative processes using concepts and legal fictions,
with the aim of categorizing ideal types in order to as-
similate change and continuity.
f. Institutional thinking about the central position of
a procedural framework and the interrelation of ends
and means, such as in negotiating and drafting con-
tracts, which can serve in illuminating international
disputes and constitution-making.
g. Self-critical thinking by abandoning the old in favor
of a fresh formulation, or by preferring change over con-
tinuity by a process of overruling, deciding whether to
continue the process of assimilation or to abandon pre-
cedent.
The skill of restraint is rooted in the tradition of law. It
contains the most valuable of the culture's human experiences.
It includes the notion of a reasoned limit, knowing where to draw
the line and how to limit the exercise of excessive public and
private power. The notions of liberty, due process, and criminal
and civil liability require fixing standards of conduct beyond
which the sanctions of law are brought to bear. The tradition of
restraint through standards set by reason and experience or
through legal process requires proportionality and balance, the
ability to limit action and response to necessity, the test of rea-
sonableness in context. The skill of restraint is needed for preserv-
ing civil liberties, framing legislation, and maintaining the rule
of law. It pervades all substantive law. 9 The skill is essential for
11P. FREUND, The Law and the Schools, in ON LAW AND JUSTICE 108, 110-15 (1968).
1C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 182-88 (2d ed.
1963). "The criteria for determining whether law is right law are very general rules of
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all action which claims the practical effect of saying; "here is the
limit of your authority: and, hither shall you go, but no further."70
The skill of systematic comprehension is the means by which
we observe the doctrinal analysis of legal concepts and processes
as a coherent whole. This skill is aided by legal scholarship, sav-
ing the task of comprehension for the bulk of law school courses.
Comprehensive doctrinal analysis thus requires perspectives de-
rived from systematic thinking. A professional should be able to
clarify assumptions and be capable of the coherent construction
of appropriate legal theories through which sustained action may
flow. Systematic legal thinking is necessary if the strategy of
action is not to lose its connection with the underlying principles
in the process of implementation. While all other intellectual
skills are elements of the comprehensive process, we are con-
cerned at this point with the skill of comprehensive inquiry itself
as represented in the work of such major figures as Pound, Ross,
Bodenheimer, and Friedmann. The skill of agreeing or not with
the various works falls within the critical evaluation skill.
B. Worldly Perspectives
The search for competence in the practical or professional
world implies a range of intellectual skills through which princi-
pled action is shaped. Worldly perspectives call for, rather than
shape, action. The law is usually passive and always requires
initiative or response. Competence in legal action, as much of this
essay has suggested, requires a healthy view of the world beyond
the clinical methodology. Holmes first pointed out that people are
willing to pay skilled professionals to employ the power of the
state on their behalf or to predict how it will be used against
them.' A large portion of legal education is implicitly concerned
with such professional competence. I have tried to show that
clinical approaches lead inevitably to the concern for a healthy
world-view, to the capacity to act according to principle in a
world which gives few favors.
procedure, and these rules of procedure do claim for themselves general validity in the
sense of the old natural law." Id. at 183.
"Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1782). This represents one of
the first attempts by an American judge, George Wythe, to enunciate the doctrine of
judicial review. Wythe held the first law professorship at William and Mary College and
followed the Jeffersonian academic tradition, providing theoretical lectures and moot
court arguments dealing with practical matters. See Letter from John Brown, a student
at William and Mary College, to William Preston, his uncle, July 6, 1780, in 9 WM. &
MARY COLLEGE Q. HIST. MAG. 79, 80 (ser. 1, 1900).
"O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
1974
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The most effective worldly perspectives that may be offered
in law schools are skills derived from (1) vicarious participation,
(2) human relations and psychology, (3) clinical participation, (4)
observation of ethics, (5) specialization, and (6) observation of
functions of order, change, and justice. While these skills may all
be viewed as in the clinical mode, I have previously tried to show
why the traditional clinical approach is an insufficient response
to the concern for legal education's function.
The method of vicarious participation places a student in a
mock situation or role through which the experience imitates the
action of law without the risks. The vicarious approach to the
world of practice may be a simple classroom experience where all
students may see themselves on the other end of a Socratic dia-
logue. It may be a mock situation of trial or appellate practice.
It may be identifying with various roles which a professional will
fill, especially interviewing, negotiating, mediating, counselling,
and advocacy. In a controlled environment the forms of ritual
conflict can be analyzed and understood with minimum harm. In
the mock setting a student may come to understand the effective-
ness of argument through withdrawal and reflection. Intellectual
skills, especially criticism, analysis, and craft, are a counter.point
to the vicarious method and necessary for full value of reflection.
Human relations skills and psychological competence pro-
vide an introduction to the complex world of human emotion.
Integration of personal identity with various professional roles
opens worldly skills well beyond advocacy or gaming or combat
by trial. By increasing role perceptions to interviewing, mediat-
ing, counselling, negotiating, persuading, cooperating, planning,
and arbitrating, the capacity for effectiveness of principled deci-
sion is greatly enlarged. The need for integration of a lawyer's
self-perception within the context of human interaction should be
introduced in law school. For the same reason, it is essential that
novice lawyers begin to learn early how to achieve personal secu-
rity in dealing with human emotions professionally. Not only will
inner security increase professional confidence, it will surely re-
duce unintended hostility, eliminate unnecessary aggression, and
avoid needlessly provoking other strong emotional responses in
others. Much of the worldly skill of any great lawyer includes such
self-mastery. Human relations skills are an especially fruitful
product of clinical methodology, either through simulated or real
experience. They appear to be essential to a healthy professional
view of the world.
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PRINCIPLED ACTION
Participation in traditional clinical action in which a student
handles an actual case for a client under professional supervision
gives limited practical experience. Being on the line or at risk, the
student is motivated to be particularly self-conscious. The intel-
lectual skill of analysis finds use in the careful dissection of a
case, from the first interview to the final judgment. Criticism is
required for increasing professional performance, and criticism
frequently-and properly-takes place independently after the
experience has concluded. The experience can be an important
introduction to the practical world for some students. A worldly
connection is made which demonstrates how principles of law in
action are skillfully used. It may for some become the symbol of
entry to the professional world. For others, it may represent inte-
grative jurisprudence in which law is action and action is a living
fusion of fact, idea, and value. For the broad function of legal
education, however, it is a world-view in embryo, for a student is
required to take a case, act on it consciously, and sustain and
defend that position at risk. The resulting understanding of ac-
tion, risk, commitment, and responsibility is the beginning of a
healthy professional world-view.
The observation of ethical consciousness in actions planned
or taken is a worldly perspective requiring intellectual skills. It
is nonetheless reflective in that it requires understanding the con-
sequences of actions and the meanings of practical choices. This
perspective is not a study of ethical rules except as the Code of
Professional Responsibility defines ethical professional conduct.
It is the process by which choices are illuminated. Consequently,
though its perspective is distinctly worldly, its function requires
the skills of analysis, criticism, and alternative thinking.
The substantive rules of law and specialization are worldly,
not intellectual matters. A professional competence requires
knowledge of the basic rules as well as the intellectual skills of
systematic comprehension, criticism, and conceptual analysis.
Until better ways are found, the extraction of rules from appellate
cases, the restatements, statutes, administrative actions, trea-
tises, and other legal reference materials will be required. The
perspectives of the clinical and the case methods are similar,
which clarifies considerably the criticism of the former by propo-
nents of the latter. The critics suggest that learning abstract rules
bears little relation to practice, while advocates of rules stress the
necessity of knowing the rules prior to entering practice. Both
methods need to rely on the intellectual skills of reasoning, evalu-
ation, and comprehension. It would be foolish indeed and neither
1974
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practical nor realistic to forego learning rules with the best intel-
lectual skill available in favor of the purely clinical approach.
A functional or structural perspective is most often confused
with intellectual speculation about public policy, the role of law
in society, and political or economic theory. The perspective is in
fact worldly because it covers complex action based on structure
of order, change, and justice. The perspective seeks to work with
institutional relationships. The professional must not only work
within existing structures and science, but must conceive of the
possibility of change. He must understand the meaning of com-
mitment to such action and how such commitment is sustained
with skill and integrity. Legislation, policy changes, treaty nego-
tiations, rulemaking by the regulatory agencies, and the adminis-
tration of the courts all require understanding of the processes
through which social interests are adjusted and values expressed.
Especially insightful is the practical reality of the process of claim
and response, of reciprocity, of action, and the intellectual tradi-
tion of restraint. In this perspective we also find the idea of sanc-
tions or coercion brought to bear for the purpose of ordering or
changing legal relationships or for giving effect to the demands
of justice. Sanctions are the final exercise of power according to
law, and there are many types to be considered.72
Many individuals, groups, or institutions participate in the
process of legal education: law students and faculty (as individu-
als and groups); other students and faculty; administrators; trus-
tees; the American Bar Association; the Association of American
Law Schools; other accrediting agencies; state governments; state
and local bar associations; law school admissions testing agen-
cies; publishers of law books and suppliers of other educational
materials; research institutes; legal services agencies; law school
alumni; and the general public. While law faculties undoubtedly
represent the most powerful group among these participants, they
are subject to pressures of other participants affecting the study
of law.
I have attempted to show that a central function of legal
education is to promote the possibility of principled action in the
I'M. BARKUN, LAW WrTHoUT SANCTIONS 166 (1968). Barkun's conclusion returns us to
the beginning thesis that preparing the new generation in law is essential for survival:
Law provides a means for maintaining change 'within humanly acceptable
limits, for allowing innovation by increments while keeping the general
scheme of things within accustomed tracks-for perpetually altering the
status quo while perpetually preserving it.
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professional world. Since the main concern is that the new gener-
ation of lawyers avoid both the nihilism of pure act and the fanta-
sies of cynical withdrawal, a healthy world-view must be sought
in law schools. Through both intellectual and worldly perspec-
tives, I believe we can offer to the new generation the possibility
of action based on principle. The role of clinical education in this
process should be extended well beyond its practical origins. In
our journey, I think we shall be joined by our old familiar
travelling companions-the case method and scholarship. Re-
freshed by the journey, I think the new lawyers will find it possi-
ble to act for others in the common good according to principles
called law. It is not convenience but necessity which leads us to
this hopeful conclusion.
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